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FEDERAL COURTS &
FEDERAL RIGHTS
COMMENTARY
Gordon Gregory Young:::

I.

INTRODUCTION

In its 1977 decision in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational ancl
Health Review Commission, 1 the Supreme Court stated that the
seventh amendment right to a jury trial2 generally was inapplicable
in administrative proceedings. More recently, the Court in
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 3 affirming the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 4 found no
violation of the seventh amendment by the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and thus determined that findings made
in an administrative enforcement proceeding could later be used
preclusively by a different party in a private legal action. 5
This Commentary asserts that the Atlas Court interpreted the
seventh amendment without attempting to deal adequately with the
text of that provision in light of its history, instead choosing to base
its decision upon earlier Supreme Court cases themselves devoid of
adequate historical analysis. 6 The Shore Court, while deciding
against the claimed seventh amendment protection, arguably undertook an analysis that is an improvement over that in .>\.tlas. The
Shore majority did not deal in detail with historical materials,
relying, as did the Atlas Court, on earlier Supreme Court cases.
The Shore majority, however, unlike Atlas, relied on an earlier
opinion that had grappled with relevant historical arguments, and
*Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of L;lw; J.D., New
York University School of Law; LL.M. Harvard University Law School.
1 430 u.s. 442 (1977).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. For the text of the seventh amendment. see tl'xt accompanying note 38 supra.
3 99 S. Ct. 644 (1979).
4 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977), affd, 99 S. Ct. 644 (1979) •.
5 See text and accompanying notes 84-117 infra.
6 See text accompanying notes 45-59 infra.
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thus may have provided the historical basis, which is indispensable
to justify its result. 7
The Atlas decision remains disturbing, notwithstanding the
opinion in Shore. The Shore decision arguably involved merely the
notion of the seventh amendment's flexibility with respect to
changes in " 'procedural incidents or details of jury trial.' "8 In contrast, the Atlas Court, in its rationale if not its holding, addressed
the vastly more important issue of congressional power to eliminate
jury trials in a given category of civil cases by simply recharacterizing them as administrative proceedings. 9
While I am disturbed by the Atlas Court's conclusions as to
the scope of the seventh amendment, I do not criticize these conclusions, but rather, the process of constitutional analysis by which
the Court arrived at them. What follows then is not a substantive
evaluation of the seventh amendment issues raised in Atlas and
Shore. 10 Nor is it an attempt to describe and criticize the Supreme
Court's analyses in a wide variety of constitutional contexts. It is,
rather, a portion of the latter task: it is a criticism of the Court's
decisionmaking process in one important case dealing with a provision of the Bill of Rights. My argument is that the analytical proSee text accompanying notes 109-17 infra.
99 S. Ct. at 654 (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1942)).
9 See text accompanying notes 67-75 infra.
10 One interesting analysis of the issue raised in Atlas was published in response
to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in tlw
companion case to Atlas, Frank lrey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). See Note,
Constitutional Law-Adminstrative Adjudications Resulting in the Imposition of a
Statutory Money Penalty Constitute a Class of Actions to Which the Se01.mth
Amendment Does Not Apply, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 458 (1976) (rejecting the posi·
tion ultimately taken by the Supreme Court). The strong textual-oriented seventh
amendment analysis made in that Note was available to, but ignored by, the Supremo
Court in Atlas.
The issue in Shore similarly had been discussed in one law review article prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in that case. See Shapiro & Coquillette, The Ft1tish
of jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442
(1971).
It is not my purpose to present original historical scholarship dealing with tho
purpose of the seventh amendment or to attempt to show merely the internal incon·
sistency of the Supreme Court's seventh amendment decisions. These tasks have
been performed admirably elsewhere. See, e.g., Henderson, The Background of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 289 (1966); Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 51 MINN. L. REv. 639, 640 (1973). See also
Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to junJ Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Ra·
tional Decision Making, 10 N.W. L. REV. 486 (1975) (arguing persuasively that the
Supreme Court's seventh amendment decisions are not based on a carefully reasoned and consistently applied theory of that amendment). I will draw on such mate·
rials to illustrate the points I wish to make.
7

8

HeinOnline -- 45 Brook. L. Rev. 1146 1978-1979

1979]

FEDERAL COURTS & RIGHTS

1147

cess employed in Atlas to define the seventh amendment jury trial
right deviates substantially from the dictates of the public notion of
"judicial morality," i.e., that which lawyers in our tradition e:-.:pect
from the Supreme Court.
II.

TAKING SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

This section is divided into three parts: Part A offers a brief
discussion of the importance to constitutional analysis of identifying
the precepts of a widely shared morality concerning how judges
ought to deal with the text of the Constitution; Part B identifies
and examines perhaps the most basic of such precepts-that historical analysis of the purpose of a particular constitutional provision is
the correct threshold inquiry in constitutional cases, because we
currently consider the Constitution to be a document written to
bind future generations; Part C then examines the Atlas case for
signs that the Supreme Court took seriously its institutional responsibility to attempt a historical-purposive analysis of the seventh
amendment.

The Notion of judicial Morality and Its Relationship
to the Notion of Rights
The discussion of legal rights is frequently confused by shifts
between descriptive and normative points of view and by the intricate ways in which such viewpoints are mutually dependent. From
the narrowest descriptive point of view, a right exists when the
highest court that will decide a matter declares it to e:dst. It is,
however, commonplace to observe that such a narrow descriptive
view does not help a judge decide a case. Thus, in order to reach a
decision, he or she will not ask the circular question, "What will
my decision be?" but rather, "How ought this case be decided
under the rules and other authoritative materials of this legal system?" It is the latter question that recognizes that the judicial decisionmaking process is subject to public ex-pectations: when lawyers, and any lay persons who seriously engage in legal argument,
criticize a judge for having erred in deciding the rights of the parties, such criticism can be based only upon some independent notion of how judges ought to decide.
To the extent that there is widely shared agreement among
lawyers about how judges ought to proceed in deciding cases, that
agreement defines a public-morality or normative perspective from
which the action of courts can be criticized. An example of an attempt to define such a critical-moral perspective is Professor
A.
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Ronald Dworkin's book, Taking Rights Seriously. 11
Dworkin focuses on "hard cases," those in which recognized
clear rules demand no one result. 12 He rejects the quite ordinary
assertion that judges simply exercise discretion in such cases,
arguing that our shared notion of what judges ought to do in such
circumstances is too complex and subtle to be characterized as
permitting pure discretion. 13 There are principles that are recognized parts of our legal system. 14 Unlike rules, principles compel
no particular result, but rather are analogous to vector arrows
pointing at results. 15 Sometimes principles which are indisputably
applicable to a single case will nevertheless point at differing results; it is then that the relative force of each principle must be determined.16 To the extent there is no authoritative view on the relative weight to be accorded to principles, judges must make
personal value judgments. 17 They must, however, be sure that
they have exhausted authoritative material first, and they must apply their values carefully and consistently. 18
Dworkin implies that lawyers tacitly understand that judges
11

R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-15 (1977). Dworkin suggests that
judicial morality requires that judges adhere to those rules that are acknowledged
parts of the legal system. These are to be found in either written constitutions, ld. at
106, validly enacted constitutional statutes, id. at 107, or the common law of the Ju·
risdiction within which the judge sits, id. at 108. Where any or all of these rules arc
applicable to a particular case, no judge may simply choose to ignore them. Rather,
he is compelled to grapple with the dictates of the legislative and common law pre·
cedents, notwithstanding that determining just how to do so may be difficult, and
there may be disagreement among responsible judges as to the proper approach.
Dworkin indicates that there is a limit to the sweep of even "settled" authorlta·
tive materials. That is, Dworkin argues that where authoritative materials compt•l no
particular result a judge must formulate and rely upon his own theory of law to de·
cide matters which are the subject of legitimate disagreement among judges. Icl. at
105-15.
12 I d. at 81.
13 I d. at 31-39, 68-71.
14 I d. at 22-24.
15 I d. at 22-28. The analogy is valid to a point. As with vectors, the result of tlw
application of a principle cannot be predicted without knowledge of the other forces
(in my metaphor, other principles) bearing on the outcome. Id. at 26. According to
Dworkin, different judges, however, legitimately may assign a different force to a
particular principle. I d. at 36. In contrast, in the world of physics each force prcsum·
ably has an objective value.
16 I d. at 35-36.
17 See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
18 I d. The judge's own values are to be applied only after authoritative material
has been exhausted, and then, only to develop the concepts that arc authoritatively
parts of the system but the content of which is disputed. Id. See R. DWORKIN, suprll
note 11, at 107, 123-30.
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ought to behave in this manner. For example, it is the prevailing
view of judicial morality that judges ought to consider publicly recognized principles, even though no authoritative written rule requires that they do so. 19 A judge therefore errs when he fails to
follow the real, although uncodified, rule that such principles must
be consulted. If his failure affects the outcome of the case, he has
established rights from a descriptive point of view, but denied
them from a public normative perspective. 20
I agree with that which Dworkin implies-that the notion of
legal rights, in a publicly recognized sense, is dependent upon a
shared perspective of how judges ought to decide cases. Courts
take rights seriously in Dworkin's sense only when they adhere to
the uncodified but real rules defining their institutional responsibility. In Part B, I hope to identify a precept of our prevailing view of
judicial morality less controversial than those upon which Dworldn
focuses and then to examine the Supreme Court's opinion in litlas
to determine whether the Court adhered to that precept.
B. judicial Morality and Constitutional Rights

There seems to be agreement among lawyers that the Constitution is binding law. Such assertion standing alone, however, is
not particularly helpful. The physical Constitution is simply cold
text, an arrangement of symbols. The meaning of any such arrangement of symbols lies solely in its use in a community of speakers. 21 This Constitution then, has no meaning apart from our understanding of how its text is to be used in making legal decisions.
It is not the physical Constitution itself which requires us to
use its text in a particular way; nor can it be merely the intent of
the long dead framers of the document which controls. It is,
rather, simply the current understanding among lawyers that the
document ought to be used in a particular way. 22
Currently, the virtually unanimous view of judicial morality as
it pertains to constitutional decisionmaking is that tl1e Constitution
R. DwoRKIN, supra note 11, at 123-26.
I d. at 279-80.
21 This is perhaps the most important lesson of Wittgenstein's later philosophy.
L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 20 (3d ed. G. Anscombe trans.
1958). See also A. KE!I.'NY, WITTGENSTEIN 155 (1973).
22 Of course, in some immediate, coercive sense, no final decisionmaker, i.e., one
whose judgment will not be reviewed by a higher authority, is required to act in any
particular way. It is recognized, however, that in a normative sense a judge is required by prevailing notions of his institutional responsibility to behave in certain
ways. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
1s

20
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ought to be treated as setting forth rules binding upon future generations. 23 Thus, the present view of judicial morality recognizes
that the Bill of Rights is designed to fix individual rights so that
they can stand against majority action 24 and can be changed only
by means of a process itself specified in a binding way. 25
If the current bedrock principle of judicial morality requires
the Constitution to be treated as a set of rules written in the past
to bind the future, then it follows that the threshold inquiry in
constitutional cases necessarily must be historical in nature. This
does not mean that historical inquiries will be made explicitly in
every case or that where made they will consume the most
decisionmaking time. It does mean, however, that courts of the
United States have a recognized obligation to deal with the Constitution as open to change only where the document itself provides
for it.
Certain constitutional provisions may indeed provide for
change. Dworkin, for example, deals admirably with loosely-woven
provisions such as the fourteenth amendment's due process clause,
arguing plausibly that the amendment itself is best understood as
an invitation to future generations to apply their own standards of
fairness. 26 There is every reason to impute to the framers the understanding that the document was to be deemed flexible where its
text reasonably suggests flexibility. 27
23 This proposition, which implies the primacy of historical analysis, is based
upon my own observations. There are, however, certainly some who seem to disagree. 2 CORWIN, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 290 (1925), reprinted In
E. CORWIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 108 (1964) ("The proper point of
view ... is that of regarding [the constitution] as a living statute, palpitating with the
purpose of the hour, reenacted with every waking breath of the American people
. . . ."). See also Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always
Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977).
24 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 133.
25 See U.S. CaNST. art. V. Article V provides, in relevant part:
The Congress, whenever, two thirds of both Houses shall deem it nee·
essary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application
of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all In·
tents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legis·
latures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be pro·
posed by the Congress ....
2s R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 131-37.
27 I d. It is no novel assertion that the concept of a constitution itself may suggest
reading flexibly those portions fairly susceptible to such a reading. This is the fair
purport of Justice John Marshall's statement, "[W]e must never forget it is a coli·
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Unfortunately, so large a part of the body of modern American
constitutional case law has dealt with such loosely-woven provisions28 that the interest-balancing analysis invited by them may
have come to seem synonymous with constitutional analysis generally. 29 It is easy, then, for courts to lose sight of the fact that such
balancing is improper, under prevailing standards of judicial morality, where the Constitution, as read in historical context, cannot
fairly be understood as authorizing it.
An example may prove helpful. How should a court deal with
a clear and specific constitutional provision such as the one that
fixes the minimum age for presidents at thirty-five years?30 No one
would suggest that a court, believing that persons were currently
maturing earlier or later than in 1791, could read thirty-five as
thirty or forty, respectively. A court would not have this freedom
even if, at the time, age was no longer generally reckoned in years
but in some other unit of time. The reason is, of course, that if the
Constitution is a binding document, such a provision, read in historical context, permits no such flexibility. Thus, if still considered
binding by the legal system then prevailing, the Constitution
would require the conversion of a candidate's age into years as that
term was understood in 1791.
The seventh amendment's command is equally unequivocal as
applicable to categories of actions that were recognized in 1791. 31
What is unclear, however, is its application to the categories recognized in the twentieth century that differ from those of the earlier
time. If the Constitution is binding, the threshold inquiry must be,
"What flexibility was envisioned for the seventh amendment when
it was drafted?"
stitution we are e:\.-pounding." McCulloch v.

~faryland,

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407

(1819) (emphasis in original).
28 Raoul Berger states that the "Fourteenth Amendment is probabl)• the largest
source of a court's business," R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY jUDICIARY 1 (1977)
(citing Frankfurter, john Marshall and the judicial Function, 69 HAn\'. L. RE\'. 217,
229 (1955)), and suggests that the Supreme Court has read its own values into that
amendment. I do not agree with all of Professor Berger's criticisms of a \'alue judgment approach as it may be applied to loosely-woven constitutional provisions such
as the fourteenth amendment.
29 It is my thesis that the Supreme Court may well ha\'e adopted such an approach in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Healtl1 Review Comm'n, 430
U.S. 422 (1977). The Supreme Court there offered no adequate reason for its seemingly flexible interpretation of the seventh amendment. For a full discussion, see text
accompanying notes 32-82 infra.
3 0 U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 4.
3 1 See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
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Atlas and its Foundation

In Atlas, 32 the Supreme Court upheld against a seventh
amendment challenge agency enforcement procedures that provided for a civil money penalty. The Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 197()33 provided that factual determinations of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the Commission) were binding upon a reviewing court if supported by substantial evidence34 and hence, it precluded a trial in court to determine the existence of violations and the propriety of civil penalties
imposed. 35 The Atlas petitioners were found by the Commission to
have violated certain safety standards of the Act and, as a consequence, abatement orders were issued and civil money penalties
were imposed. 36 Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the procedures of the Commission, rejecting petitioners' contention that
the statutory scheme denied them their right to a trial by jury as
guaranteed by the seventh amendment, 37 which provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of common law. 38

The announced rationale39 for Atlas is essentially that whenever Congress creates a new cause of action, regardless of its remedial characteristics, it can avoid jury trial rights by providing for
32 430 U.S. 442 (1977). In the same opinion the Atlas Court decided Frank lwy,
Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
33 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-671 (1976).
34 I d. § 660(a).
35 See 430 U.S. at 447.
36
See id. Petitioners, following the review procedures of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
659-661, (1976), unsuccessfully contested the orders and penalties. See 430 U.S. at
447-48.
37
Petitioners argued that a suit in federal court for the imposition of a civil pen·
alty was a suit for a money judgment, a legal action, and therefore acquired a right to
a jury trial. See id. at 449. Petitioners argued further that Congress could not nbrogate that right by assigning to an agency the power to determine the governnwnt's
right to a civil penalty. See id. at 450.
38
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
39
There is a possible argument, based upon the understanding of the framNS of
the Bill of Rights that, if the Court had so chosen, Atlas could have been decided on
the ground that no matter the nature of the forum, suits by the federal governml'nt
are triable without a jury. The argument, however, has been dismissed as wenk. S!'l'
Note, supra note 10 at 477-81.
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agency adjudication. 40 The Atlas Court concluded from prior cases
that when Congress creates "new statutory 'public rights' " it may
provide, consistently with the seventh amendment, that an administrative agency will be charged with adjudicating those rights. 41 The
Court reasoned, in part:
Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to choke
the already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation
nor prevented from committing some new types of litigation to
administrative agencies with special competence in the field.
This is the case even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned
instead to a federal court of law instead of an administrative
agency. 42

1

Clearly, the Atlas Court's suggestion that such congressional
power is confined to public rights is not meaningful unless it is
construed to mean that the power is confined to any regulation of
private conduct that affects the public interest. This construction is
supported by the Atlas Court's characterization of an earlier case,
which also permitted agency instead of jury factfinding, as within
the sweep of that congressional power over "public rights." That
case, NLRB v. jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 43 involved an administrative right to recover back pay, which Congress used to supplant analogous contract rights enforceable at common law. 44
The Atlas Court, however, failed to offer an adequate justification for its interpretation of the seventh amendment, either in
terms of precedent or the language and history of the amendment.
This lack of reasoned justification is evidence of what I believe to
be the Court's failure to take seventh amendment rights seriously.
40 430 U.S. at 455. The Court's announcement is particularly interesting in light
of its holding in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 193-95 (1974). There, the jury right
was asserted in a private action authorized by § 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976). The Court held that if Congress creates a new pri\oate cause
of action that is to proceed in federal court and "involves rights and remedies of the
sort typically enforced in an action at law," the right to a jury trial attaches. 415 U.S.
at 195. Thus the Curtis Court apparently considered to be relevant both the forum to
which the litigants were assigned and the resemblance of the statutorily created
cause of action to an action at common law.
41 430 U.S. at 455 (emphasis added).
42 I d. at 453-54.
43 301 u.s. 1 (1937).
44 Prior to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 tl976), an employee's suit to recover for wrongful dismissal under a contract of emplo)ment
would have been a suit at common law. For a further discussion of )ones i.~
Laughlin, see text accompanying notes 46-53 infra.
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(1) Precedential justification for the Atlas Interpretation of
the Seventh Amendment. To begin with precedent, jones &
Laughlin is arguably one of only two cases in which the Supreme
Court dealt explicitly with, and denied the existence of, the right
to a trial by jury in an administrative proceeding. 45 In jones &
Laughlin the respondent argued that an order to pay back wages
was synonymous with a money judgment and that consequently in
a proceeding seeking such relief, it must be accorded the right to a
jury trial. The Court rejected that argument, observing that the
seventh amendment "perserves" the right to a jury trial as that
right was recognized at common law when the amendment was
adopted. 46 Accordingly, the amendment "has no application to
cases where recovery of money damages is an incident to equitable
relief even though damages might have been recovered in an action at law. . . . It does not apply where the proceeding is not in
the nature of a common law suit. "47 Determining then that the action before it was neither one at common law nor one in the nature
of such action, the Court concluded, "The proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is a statutory proceeding. Reinstatement of the employee and payment for lost time are requirements
imposed for the violation of the statute and are remedies appropriate to its enforcement."4 S
The Atlas Court seized upon the Court's "statutory" characterization of the proceeding, quoting in text that portion of the
Court's statement and giving it emphasis. 49 The Atlas Court, howThe Atlas Court itself noted, 430 U.S. at 456, that some of the cases upon
which it relied did not expressly address the seventh amendment question:
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287
U.S. 329 (1932); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Oceanic Nav. Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1855). Notwithstanding, the Court considered that each did lnvolw
nonjudicial factfinding and found it "difficult to believe that these holdings or dicta
did not subsume the proposition that a jury trial was not required." 430 U.S. at 456.
The Court did note further, however, that the other cases upon which It rl'iit'd
expressly considered that administrative factfinding was not barred by tht' St'Venth
amendment. Id.; Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Lot•tht'r,
415 U.S. 189 (1974); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). However, two of the cases
did so in dicta: in Pernell, the Court recognized the right to a jury trial when a judi·
cia! forum is provided for disputes involving ·legal issues, and in Curtis, the right to a
jury trial was found applicable to a statutorily created private damage action brought
in federal court. For a discussion of the Block case, see text accompanying nott•s
54-58 infra.
4 6 301 U.S. at 48.
47Jd.
48 ld. at 48-49 (citations omitted).
49 In discussing jones & Laughlin, the Atlas Court quoted:
45
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ever, relegated to a footnote its observation that the Jones &
Laughlin Court disposed of the constitutional claim "on the separate grounds that the amendment is inapplicable where 'recovery
of money damages is an incident to [nonlegal] relief.' "50 The Atlas
Court took great pains to reject that alternative ex-planation of
Jones & Laughlin in favor of one affirming congressional power to
assign such supplanting actions to agency factfinding, stating:
The Court also rejected the Seventh Amendment claim in Jones
& Laughlin on the separate ground . . . [that] in such cases
courts of equity would historically have granted monetary relief.
In Jones & Laughlin, the NLRB ordered reinstatement of a dismissed employee, an order analogous to injunctive relief historically obtainable only in a court of equity, and consequently this
alternative ground was an adequate one to decide Jones &
Laughlin. However, this alternative ground would have been insufficient to decide the more general question of the NLRB's
power to order backpay where, for one reason or anotlter, no
such equitable order was sought. 51

The Jones & Laughlin Court, however, certainly seemed to
have considered the equitable "clean-up" doctrine52 to be an ex-planation for finding the seventh amendment inapplicable. My argu"The instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such
suit. The proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is a statutory
proceeding. Reinstatement of the employee and payment for time lost are
requirements [administratively] imposed for violation of tlJC statute and are
remedies appropriate to its enforcement. The contention under the Seventh
Amendment is without merit."
430 U.S. at 453 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. l, 48-49
(1937)) (brackets and emphasis added by the Atlas Court).
5o Id. at n.lO (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1937)) (brackets added by the Atlas Court).
51 Id.
52 Traditionally, the equity "clean-up" doctrine allowed a court of equity, in certain circumstances, to dispose of an entire case, including any issues of a legal nature
that might have been involved. See DOBBS, REMEDIES 84 (1973). For example, in
Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1945), the court ruled that
where plaintiff sought an injunction or specific performance and was entitled to
money damages, the chancellor, in determining equitable issues, might also determine the legal issues. Thus, in a restricted number of cases, when the legal issue
was viewed as "incidental" to the equitable claim, the latter overshadowed the
former. See DOBBS, supra, at 84. The use of the "clean-up" doctrine to authorize an
equity court to exercise jurisdiction over legal issues has retained little significance
today, in part because of the ease with which equitable and legal claims may be
joined and the existence of legal and equitable counterclaims. See RE, EQUITY M"D
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES 33 (1975). Cf. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469
(1962) (holding that the jury trial right could not be lost when legal claims were
joined with equitable claims).
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ment with the Atlas Court's use of jones & Laughlin is not that the
jones & Laughlin Court clearly did intend the equitable nature of
such proceeding to be the sole ground for its decision. It is, rather,
that the] ones & Laughlin Court, in the case before it, might have
understood such reason to be the crucial factor, notwithstanding
the Court's going beyond that statement. 53 The Atlas Court's complete reliance on the portion of the Court's statement concerning
the statutory nature of the proceeding does not seem wholly justifiable. Whatever the actual justification for the] ones & Laughlin decision, however, the ultimate point here is that even a court that exalts stare decisis over a reasoned and historically informed
explication of the Constitution's text would not find]ones & Laughlin to be tightly binding precedent; the lack of a fully reasoned
analysis as well as the availability of multiple explanations makes
difficult any firm reliance upon that case.
Block v. Hirsh 5 4 is the second of the two precedents that dealt
explicitly with the right to jury trials in administrative proceedings.
The Block Court, indeed, was presented with the argument that an
administrative scheme violated the seventh amendment because it
consigned to an agency for factual determination questions in a
landlord-tenant dispute concerning the right to possession of real
property. 55 Although the Block Court offered little discussion of
the seventh amendment issue, the opinion, finding no bar to the
administrative scheme, 56 must be considered responsive to that argument.
Block surely can be treated as precedent in favor of the Atlas
Court's interpretation of the seventh amendment. Notwithstanding
that an action to recover possession of property is a legal action, 57
the Block Court held valid the procedure that denied a jury trial.
Of course, there are ways in which an advocate would attempt to
There are hvo possible justifications that may be offered for the jones &
Laughlin Court's additional statements. First, the essential factor enabling the Court
legitimately to characterize the proceeding as "statutory" may have been that the
proceeding did not supplant a common law suit but only an equitable one. Howevt•r,
a second explantation, considered either as dictum or an alternative holding, I admit
is more plausible, see note 49 infra; the Court may have considered that the statu·
tory character of the proceeding was alone sufficient to find that no jury trial right
existed.
54 256 u.s. 135 (1921).
55
It is not clear from the reported case that the seventh amendment argument
was made, but that point was briefed to the Court. Brief for Defendant In Error at 4,
19-21, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
56 256 U.S. at 158.
57 Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891).
53
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blunt the force of the decision. For example, the legislation challenged in Block was an emergency measure enacted to fight the severe housing shortage generated by war58 and thus, the holding
plausibly could be limited to the war emergency context. Nevertheless, I think it must be treated as supporting precedent.
It is important to note, however, that neither Block nor jones
& Laughlin contained reasoned analysis of the seventh amendment's application to administrative proceedings. Both ] ones LLaughlin and Block merely offer unsupported conclusions about
the effect of the seventh amendment without any apparent attempt
to examine the language of that provision in its historical context.
Indeed, in neither ]ones & Laughlin nor Block did the Court have
sophisticated briefs dealing with the seventh amendment argument. In each case, to the extent that the argument was made at
all, it appeared almost as an afterthought. 59 It was not until three
decades later, in Atlas, that the Court had before it both the isolated issue of the application of the amendment to administrative
actions60 and thoughtful briefs dealing with the amendment in its
historical context. 61 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, which has
asserted that stare decisis has less force in the constitutional context than in others, 62 chose to support its explication of the seventh
amendment upon a case law foundation either wanting in reasoned
analysis or inconclusive as to the grounds supporting it.
Although there were no dissents in Atlas, in its companion
case, Frank Irey, Jr.; Inc. v. Occupational Safety ancl Health Commission, 63 a dissent was registered in the United States Court of
256 U.S. at 155-56.
The arguments on the general applicability of the seventh amendmcmt to the
administrative proceedings were conclusory. Sec, e.g., Brief for Defendant in Error at
19-21, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Brief for Respondent at 99-105, NLRB \'.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
so Both Block and jones & Laughlin were complex cases presenting substantial
issues along with the seventh amendment issue: in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 22-44 (1937), the Court considered the validity of regulatory programs under the commerce clause, and in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153-SS
(1921), the Court considered the legitimacy of the use of police powers in an emergency context. A fair reading of the briefs and opinions in each cas!.' indicates that in
both the amendment issue occupied a small portion of the enl•rgies of the Court and
advocates.
6 1 See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
62 See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 6.58, 695 (1978)
("[W]e have stated that stare decisis has more force in statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because, in the former situation, Congress l'Un 1.-orrect our
mistakes through legislation ....") (citation omitted).
63 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd on rcllcaring, 519 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1975),
affd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
58
59
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Appeals for the Third Circuit by Judge Gibbons. 64 Judge Gibbons,
discussing the position adopted by the court of appeals' majority,
and that ultimately taken by the Supreme Court, argued that the
result effectively gave Congress the power to define and limit the
reach of the seventh amendment. Judge Gibbons disagreed that
the conclusion was supported by precedent, stating:
If this is the teaching of the one authority upon which the
majority relies, then unbeknownst to the world of legal scholarship, NLRB v. jones & Laughlin Steel Corp . ... [effected] the
most profound and enormous redistribution of power among the
three branches of the federal government of any case in the
Court's history. . . . [I]f Congress can by fiat define the term
"administrative adjudication" and thereby necessarily define the
seventh amendment term "Suits at common law," what role do
the article III courts play? ... [M)y point is that ... the constitutional scheme of things requires that the Court, not Congress,
give meaning to the Constitutional terms, and thereby define
the limits of administrative proceedings. 65

In light of their thin analytical underpinnings, neither jones &
Laughlin nor Block seem compelling as precedents. 66 An examination of Atlas for signs of constitutional analysis which deals directly
with the meaning of the seventh amendment in its historical context yields equally unsatisfactory results.
(2) Textual and Historical justification for the Atlas Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment. While the Atlas position may ultimately prove to be justified by an historical-purposive analysis, it
is difficult to discern such justification from the opinion by the
Court. Surely, before it avoided the plausible, narrow justifications
for nonjury trials supplied by both Block and jones & Laughlin,
and before it recognized a sweeping congressional power, the Atlas
Court was obligated to offer an adequately documented and reasoned analysis of the seventh amendment's text as understood in its
historical context. 67 The Court provided almost none, however. 08
64Jd. at 1207, 1219.
ld. at 1221-22 (citation omitted).
66 Additionally, courts do have the power to and do occasionally overrule a case
on the ground that it was wrongly decided. See Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling portion of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961)).
67 See text accompanying notes 21-31 supra.
68
The Court does provide a brief glimpse of some of the history of the amend·
65
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Instead, the Court offered a series of ipse dixits, demonstrative of
the Court's position yet unenlightening as to its rationale.
The Court stated that the seventh amendment was merely
«declaratory of the existing law" since it mandated only that a trial
by jury ·\vas to be ·preserved'"; hence the amendment "did not
purport to require a jury trial where none was required before. " 69
Additionally, the amendment attempted neither to alter the methods of determining facts in actions traditionally tried without a
jury, 70 nor to ··freeze equity jurisdiction" as it was in 1789. 71 The
Court then emphasized that «the Seventh Amendment was never
intended to establish the jury as the exclusive mechanism for
factfinding in civil cases,"72 and concluded:
[The seventh amendment] took the existing legal order as it
found it, and there is little or no basis for concluding that the
Amendment should now be interpreted to provide an impenetrable barrier to administrative factfinding under othenvise valid
federal regulatory statutes. We cannot conclude that the Amendment rendered Congress powerless . . . to create new public
rights and remedies by statute and commit their enforcement, if
it chose to, to a tribunal other than a court of law-such as an
administrative agency-in which facts are not found by
• •
JUnes
.... 73
The Atlas Court addressed the very real concern that its decision would permit Congress to nullify the jury trial right since
Congress could freely assign to an administrative forum those
disputes concerning matters heretofore adjudicated in a judicial forum. The Court responded to that concern, not with reasons for
the existence of the congressional power asserted, but with a promise that some limit exists:
The argument is well put, but it overstates the holdings of our
prior cases and is in any event unpersuasive. Our prior cases
support administrative factfinding in only those situations involving "public rights," .e.g., where the Government is involved
ment, 430 U.S. at 459-60, but does so from the perspective of cases dealing with the
issue tangentially or in other contexts.
69 Id. at 459.
7o I d.
71 I d.
72 Id. at 460.
73 Id.
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in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute
creating enforceable public rights. Wholly private tort, contract,
property and a vast range of other cases as well are not at all implicated. 74

The articulated limit to congressional power, i.e., the "public
rights" concept, seems coextensive with the federal government's
power to create agencies to regulate matters designated to be of
national concern. Consequently, it is arguable that the limit exists
only after congressional action has rendered it meaningless to a litigant.75
If the Court were not constrained by the Constitution, but
were instead free to base its decisions upon the Justices' notions of
prudence, the Court perhaps could determine plausibly that jury
trials are either undesirable or desirable in federal civil actions and
apply the seventh admendment accordingly. The Court, however,
is considered bound by the Constitution. 76 This entails, under the
prevailing standards of judicial morality, that the Court is expected
to render its constitutional interpretations in the light of the framers' purposes. 77
(3) Analysis Not Undertaken and Important Arguments Not
Answered By the Court in Atlas. The Atlas petitioners, using language from an earlier Supreme Court opinion and citing to other
historical materials, urged a position that seems compelling on the
surface at least: " 'In a just sense, the Amendment then may well
be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they
may assume to settle legal rights.' "78 There is a strong argument,
based upon historical materials, that the words "common law" as
used in the seventh amendment were indeed intended to deflne a
I d. at 458.
It might be argued, for example, that once Congress has determined to plact• a
matter in the hands of an agency for resolution, the "national interest" label would
attach and hence, Congress will be deemed to have exercised its power within the
limitation defined.
76
See text accompanying notes 21-31 supra.
74

75

77

See id.

78

Brief for Petitioners at 24, Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
443, 446 (1830) (emphasis by Petitioners deleted, emphasis added).
Judge Gibbons proposed this argument in his dissent in frey. 519 F.2d at
1207-15; see also Note, supra note 10, wherein the position is stated forcefully. Tlw
argument was not answered by the Court in Atlas save in a conclusory mnnnt•r, S!'l'
text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
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catch-all category for all proceedings other than those which by historical accident were triable solely to a judge. 79
The Atlas Court had available to it materials with which to
shape a meaningful response to petitioners' argument. 80 However,
the Court did not reveal whether it considered the historical materials and resolved that the materials {1) were clearly in favor of the
nonapplication of the seventh amendment to administrative proceedings, or (2) were inconclusive, thereby permitting the consideration of such factors as efficiency in the decisionmaking process.
A court that takes seriously its obligation to deal with an important application of a guarantee of individual rights has a duty, at
the very least, to offer an account of its struggle with historical materials. 81 The Supreme Court failed to fulfill that duty in l1tlas. I
would urge, therefore, that the far-reaching statements in Atlas be
reconsidered at the next available opportunity. The historical arguments must be answered or, if they remain unanswered after reference to available material, the Court must so declare and ex-plain
why it should indulge in a presumption against the plausible interpretation of the seventh amendment, which yields protection under a ..catch-all" definition of ..common law. " 82
In the brief to the Atlas Court, the petitioners cited the following authorities:
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73; An Act for the Ease of the Subject, 21
James 1, ch. 4; Act of March 3, 1803; Leg. History Note, 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1783, at
7623 (1970 ed.); American Act, 4 Geo. 3, ch. 151; Declaration of Independence; 12
THmL\S }EFFERSON PAPERS (Princeton Univ. Press 1950); 2 WORKS OF ~IADISO:S,
183 (1900); 1-2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CO:SSTlTUTIO:S OF THE U:SlTED
STATES (1833); l. ESPINARSE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AC"riO:S O:S PE...,AL
STATUTES 5 (1813); FEDERAL PAPERS, No. 83 (The New American Library of World
Literature, 1961 ed.); l.W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF E:SGUSH LAw; PLUK:sETT,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (5th eel.); 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF }om.;
ADAMS (A.L. Wroth & H. Zibot, eds. 1965); Henderson, The Background of the Sccenth Amendment, 80 HARv. L. REv. 289 (1967). Brief for the Petitioners at \•i·\'il,
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442
(1977).
Respondents' brief cited 34 separate documents, including correspondence of
the framers, proposed amendments to the Bill of Rights and state constitutions and
declarations of rights. Among those authorities cited and not included in the list of
sources cited by petitioner were: 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS (1789); BIOGI\APIUCAL
DIC"riONARY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1971 (G.P.O. 1971); ~L\L'-:, THE
.ANTIFEDERALISTS (1961); A.T. MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE: A.''TlFEDER·
ALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964); SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCU·
lliENTARY HISTORY (1971). Brief for the Respondents at viii-xii, Atlas Roofing Co. "·
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 422 (1977).
8o See note 79 supra.
81 See text accompanying notes 21-31 supra.
82 See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
79
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HISTORICAL-PURPOSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE

SEVENTH AMENDMENT

As noted at the outset, 83 the Supreme Court's decision in
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore 84 arguably offers an analysis more
satisfactory than that offered by the Atlas Court. In Shore, plaintiff
instituted a federal class action on behalf of minority shareholders
against Parklane Hosiery Co. and several of its officers, directors
and controlling shareholders. 85 Plaintiff alleged essentially that defendants made misleading statements in a proxy statement by failing to disclose material facts about a proposed merger. 86 Seeking
recision of the merger and money damages, plaintiff claimed that
the failure to disclose violated87 sections lO(b), 13(a), 14(a), and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 88
During the pendency of the class action, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) brought suit in the federal district court
against Parklane and its president, both of whom were defendants
in the class action. 89 The SEC alleged facts concerning the proxy
statement that were basically identical to those in the class action. 90 Seeking an injunction and other equitable relief, the SEC
alleged violations of the Securities Act of 193391 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.92
The district court decided the SEC's action for equitable relief, finding that the proxy statement was misleading in failing to
disclose material facts. The court imposed liability under section
14(a), but limited the relief to requiring Parklane to amend its erroneous filings with the SEC. 93 The Second Circuit affirmed this
disposition. 94
Thereafter, plaintiff in the class action moved for summary
judgment against the defendants named in the SEC suit, arguing
83

See text accompanying notes 1-10 supra.
99 S. Ct. 644 (1979).
See 565 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 644 (1979).
8 6 See id. at 816-17.
87 See id.
88 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), 78n(a), 78t(a) (1976).
8 9 See 565 F.2d at 817.
90 See id.
91 Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
92 Sections 10(b), 13(a) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), 78n(a) (1976).
93 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 486-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd,
558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977), aff' d, 99 S. Ct. 644 (1979).
94 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977), aff' d, 99 S. Ct. 644 (1979).
84
85
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that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the defendants from
relitigating the facts determined in the SEC enforcement proceeding. The district court rejected this argument, apparently persuaded by the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Rachal v. Hill, 95 which required a jury trial under
circumstances similar to those in Shore. The Shore order permitting a jury trial was certified to the Second Circuit, and that
court reversed. 9 6
Rachal held that the seventh amendment required a jury trial
of the issues raised in a private damage suit under the securities
laws although the same issues had been determined adversely to a
defendant in an earlier SEC injunction action. 97 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that Supreme Court precedent demonstrated great deference to the demand for a jury trial. 98 In particular, the Supreme
Court has required that in a suit in which both legal and equitable
claims appear, the legal claim is to be tried first to a jury to avoid
jeopardizing the valued "right" to a jury trial. 99 Persuaded by this
requirement, the Rachal court would not allow the offensive use of
collateral estoppel to defeat the jury trial right.
The Second Circuit in Shore rejected the analysis offered in
Rachal. The court disagreed that the precedent provided by the
Supreme Court indicated the unconstitutionality of the use of col95 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970). In denying the summary judgment motion, the
district court merely cited the Rachal case. See 565 F.2d at 818.
96 565 F.2d at 818.
97 435 F.2d at 60-61.
98 Id. at 63-64. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959)
("only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the
flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot anticipate, can the right to a jury
trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims"); Dairy
Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 (1962) (where both legal and equitable issues are
presented in a single case, "any legal issues for which a jury trial is timely and properly demanded [must] be submitted to a jury"). In addition to the seventh amendment question, the Rachal court also noted its doubt as to whether collateral estoppel could appropriately be applied in light of a lack of mutuality and considerations
of fairness. 435 F.2d at 63. The court, however, found it unnecessary to rely on this
ground. Id. For a discussion of the importance of a lack of mutuality to the seventh
amendment argument in Shore, see notes 106-17 and accompanying text infra.
99 In Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), plaintiff sought
injunctive and declaratory relief in connection with a threatened antitrust action. Defendant interposed a counterclaim seeking treble damages for alleged antitrust violations. The lower court had rejected a request for a jury trial on the legal claim since
it had been joined with the equitable claim. The Supreme Court, however, refused
to allow the equitable claim to take priority over the legal claim and insisted upon
the right to a jury trial.
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lateral estoppel in the circumstances presented. 100 Rather, the Second Circuit determined that the Supreme Court in fact implicitly
recognized that collateral estoppel was available to bar a legal claim
after a determination on an equitable claim. 101 The Second Circuit
reasoned that had the Supreme Court not made this assumption,
then in a suit in which the claims were joined, the order of trying
the claims would have been of no moment. An earlier nonjury fact
determination would have presented no danger of obliterating the
jury trial right "since the defendant would ... have been guaranteed a jury trial of the [legal claim] regardless of the outcome of
the equitable claim. " 102 The Shore court then concluded that when
an equitable claim has been fully and fairly litigated in an earlier
suit and facts have been determined against a defendant there, collateral estoppel may be invoked to bar a later legal claim without
offending the seventh amendment, 103 notwithstanding that the
later claim is brought by a different party.
In considering the availability of collateral estoppel, the Fifth
Circuit applied the seventh amendment right to a jury trial literally, while the Second Circuit rested its contrary result on a plausible interpretation of earlier Supreme Court cases.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari104 to resolve the conflict between the Second and Fifth Circuits. 105 As in the circuit
courts, the issue was not whether a prior equitable suit could be
given collateral estoppel effect in a later common law suit when the
parties in each were the same; 106 an application of collateral estoppel where there was mutuality of parties apparently was recognized
prior to the framing of the seventh amendment and thus was beyond the scope of its guarantee. 107 The issue before the Supreme
Court was, rather, whether the seventh amendment was compatible with the use of collateral estoppel to benefit a plaintiff who was
not a party to the prior equitable proceeding. Such an application
100

The Second Circuit reviewed the cases upon which the Fifth Circuit relied,

e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
101
565 F.2d at 820.
102 I d. at 820-21 (emphasis and brackets added).
103 I d. at 821.
1 04 435 u.s. 1006 (1978).
1°5 See 99 S. Ct. at 648 & n.3.
106 Rachal and Shore each involved a private plaintiff's attempt in a suit nt com·
mon law, to have the benefit of facts found in an earlier equitable proceeding
brought by an administrative agency. See 435 F.2d at 60-61; 565 F.2d at 817·18.
107 See 99 S. Ct. at 653-54.
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of collateral estoppel, free of the requirement of mutuality, was unknown in 1791, 108 and therefore arguably violative of the seventh
amendment.
In deciding the issue in favor of preclusion, the Shore majority
found "no persuasive reason . . . why the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment should depend on whether or not mutuality of parties
is present. , 109 The Court characterized collateral estoppel as a
"procedural device[ ]"110 and analogized to such other devices as
directed verdict and summary judgment, the use of which had
been held consistent with the seventh amendment111 notwithstanding that they had been developed after its adoption. 112 Although the Shore majority undertook no extensive independent
historical analysis of the seventh amendment, 113 the Court relied
in particular on one case that addressed the historical arguments
concerning the relationship of the seventh amendment to the use
of a directed verdict. 114 In Galloway v. United States, 115 the majority analyzed the historical materials and determined that "[t]he
[Seventh] Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact
procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the common-law
system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence then prevailing.,116 Applying the Galloway rationale, the Shore majority
deemed it immaterial that mutuality was necessary in 1791 and
concluded that the seventh amendment posed no bar to the application of collateral estoppel.117
See id. at 653, 655.
Id. at 654.
110 Id.
111 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-93 (1943) (directed verdict);
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 {1902) (summary judgment). See also Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 {1931)
(retrial on damage issue alone).
112 99 S. Ct. at 654. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argued that the devices relied
on by the majority in fact did have counterparts at common law and thus, their use
could be justified on that basis. I d. at 660-61.
113 Adopting a rationale similar to that of the Second Circuit, sec text accompanying notes 100-103 supra, the Supreme Court noted that the notion "that an equitable determination could have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action
was the major premise" of the Court's holding in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959). 99 S. Ct. at 653.
114 99 S. Ct. at 654.
115 319 u.s. 372 (1942).
116 Id. at 390.
117 The Shore Court stated:
The law of collateral estoppel, like the law in other procedural areas
1os
109
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It might be argued that in at least relying on a case wherein a
historical analysis was undertaken, the Supreme Court in Shore
discharged its institutional responsibility to provide the historical
basis for the result that otherwise makes sense only in terms of efficiency and fairness. Justice Rehnquist' s dissent, 118 based on his
reading of the seventh amendment in its historical context, also,
seems to offer precisely the required analytical foundation. Asserting that "[t]he right to trial by jury in civil cases at common
law is fundamental to our history and jurisprudence," Justice
Rehnquist argued that the majority had "reduced this valued right
. . . to a mere 'neutral' factor. " 119 In his view, the application of
the seventh amendment, "perhaps more than with any other provision of the Constitution, [is] determined by reference to the historical setting in which the Amendment was adopted. "1 20
Noting the Court's statement in Galloway, Justice Rehnquist
recognized that the seventh amendment is meant to preserve "not
the incidental or collateral effects of common law practice in 1791"
but the substance of the jury trial right. 121 He rejected the notion,
however, that this view of the amendment's reach would permit a
drastic incursion into the role of the jury simply by implementing
"any nominally 'procedural change.' " 122 Since, in his view, a substantial alteration in the jury's province easily could be termed
"procedural reform," any other position essentially would permit
"judicial repeal" of the seventh amendment. 123 Justice Rehnquist
forcefully argued that in view of the constitutional underpinnings of
the jury trial right, an "invasion" of the jury's function, beyond that
recognized in 1791, could not be justified by mere invocation of
considerations of judicial economy or accuracy. 124
defining the scope of the jury's function, has evolved since 1791. Under tht•
rationale of the Galloway case, these developments are not repugnant to the
Seventh Amendment simply for the reason that they did not exist in 1791.
99 S. Ct. at 654.
118 I d. at 655-64.
119 I d. at 655.
120
I d. at 656.
121
Id. at 659.
122 I d.
123 I d.
124
Id. Justice Rehnquist argued further that, even assuming no seventh amend·
ment violation, offensive use of collateral estoppel ought not to be permitted "wlww
the party who is sought to be estopped has not had an opportunity to haw the fal'ts
of his case determined by a jury." Id. at 661-62. He discussed and rejel'ted tlw pru·
dential considerations with respect to efficiency that would be paramount In
deciding whether to apply collateral estoppel to the facts in Shore. Citing the "strung
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Justice Rehnquist's vigorous Shore dissent suggests that he
takes seriously seventh amendment rights and reflects agreement
with the analytical approach presented in Section II above. There
does appear, however, to be an inconsistency between the thrust
of his attack on the Shore majority and his belief in the continued
validity of the Atlas decision, in which he took part. 125 Citing Atlas
and jones & Laughlin, 126 Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed that Congress could "commit enforcement of statutorily created rights to
an ·administrative process or specialized court,' " 127 notwithstanding that in Shore he could "see no 'imperative circumstance'
requiring this wholesale abrogation of jury trials. " 128
Justice Rehnquist's citation of Atlas and jones & uwghlin is in
conflict with his earlier statement that
to sanction creation of procedural devices which limit the prO\'•
ince of the jury to a greater degree than permitted at common
law in 1791 is in direct contravention of the Seventh Amendment. And since we deal here not with the common law qua
common law but \vith the Constitution, no amount of argument
that the device provides for more efficiency or more accuracy or
is fairer \viii save it if the degree of invasion of the jury's prO\'·
ince is greater than allowed in 1791. To rule otherwise would effectively permit judicial repeal of the Seventh Amendment because nearly any change in the province of the jury, no matter
how drastic the diminution of its function, can always be denominated "procedural reform. "129

Justice Rehnquist's position would seem to be that it is unacceptable for the sake of procedural efficiency to permit the abrogation of the jury trial right. Yet, is not agency adjudication of
disputes that were formerly actions at common law simply a more
dramatic instance of a "procedural device," serving to eliminate the
federal policy favoring jury trials," id. at 662 (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Jacobs v. New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942)),
Justice Rehnquist could discern no "unmanageable problems that have resulted"
from their use. I d.
125 I d. at 662 n.21. The Atlas decision was unanimous; Justice Blackmun did not
participate.

Id.
Id. (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974)).
128 I d. at 662. Justice Rehnquist also remarked, "The founders of our Nation <:on·

12s
127

sidered the right of trial by jury in civil cases an important-bulwark against tyr.tnny
and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of tlu.• SO\'l'reign, or, it
might be added, to that of the judiciary." I d. at 657.
129 99 S. Ct. at 659.
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"province of the jury" in a class of cases wherein a jury trial would
have been available in 1791? Justice Rehnquist seems to suggest
that any compromise based upon considerations of efficiency would
admit of no logical stopping point. 130 As a result, it remains a mystery why Justice Rehnquist was willing to make this compromise in
the Atlas case, where he participated in the Court's partial, but
significant repeal of the seventh amendment.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the Shore majority and dissent evince somewhat
more respect for textual-historical inquiry than did the unanimous
Atlas Court, neither opinion gives any indication that the Atlas
case, in its far-reaching impact, will be reexamined employing the
proper historical base. That case, however, must be reexamined; if
we are committed to the seventh amendment guarantee, then the
Court must justify with a considered textual analysis a decision that
sanctions not merely changes in procedure but arguably large-scale
destruction by Congress of the right to trial by jury.
130

See text accompanying note 123 supra.
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